what factor contributed to the success of the tokugawa shogunates afforestation efforts (points 3)
2.Edo Flow: Pre-weather condition for Industrialization
(See Handout no.two)
The Edo period: 1603-1867
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| Nikko Toshogu Shrine (Yomei Gate) |
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| Tokugawa Ieyasu, the showtime Edo Shogun |
From the late 12th century through the 17th century, Nihon was ruled by samurais (armed services leaders) simply politics remained unstable. Internal wars and power shifts were very frequent, especially during the late 15th century to the end of the 16th century (called Sengoku Jidai, or warring period).
Finally, Ieyasu Tokugawa unified the country afterward the decisive Battle of Sekigahara (located between Nagoya and Kyoto, visible from Shinkansen) in 1600 and the attacks on Osaka Castle in 1615 where the rival Toyotomi family perished. Ieyasu established a new regime in Edo and became the first shogun of the Edo Bakufu in 1603. Edo, a sleepy little boondocks until and so, was transformed into a huge political city by ambitious public works including state reclamation, new canals and clean h2o supply systems. The Tokugawa family ruled the country in the adjacent 264 years (15 shoguns in all). Ieyasu Tokugawa was deified and worshiped in Nikko Toshogu Shrine (even today).
Nosotros start the story of Japan's economic development from the Edo period because pre-atmospheric condition for later industrialization and modernization were created internally during this menstruum (moreover, quantitative data for earlier periods are very limited). The following are the pre-weather that were generated:
(i) Political unity and stability
(2) Agricultural development in terms of both area and productivity
(3) Development of transportation and the existence of nationally unified markets
(4) The ascension of commerce, finance and the wealthy merchant class
(five) The rise of manufacturing (food processing, handicraft, etc)
(half dozen) Industrial promotion by cardinal and local governments (sometimes successful but not always)
(7) High level of education
These are the features of the Edo catamenia which are unremarkably cited by many researchers. The remainder of this lecture discusses them in detail. Annotation that some of these conditions are non accomplished even today in some countries. In fact, developing countries that are equipped with all these conditions are relatively rare.
Here are some bones terminology for the Edo flow:
| Edo | The old proper noun for Tokyo. Edo literally ways the oral fissure of bay. Incidentally, Tokyo means eastern capital (the western, or the traditional, capital is Kyoto). |
| Daimyo | Regional samurai ruler. During the Edo menstruation, it meant the head samurai of a local government (han). |
| Shogun | Originally, the supreme commander of dispatched ground forces. But it commonly ways the head of a central armed services government. |
| Bakufu | Residence of a armed services ruler. Later it meant the central military government itself. |
| Han | A local government (like province or prefecture) in the Edo catamenia. |
Features of the Bakufu-Han System
The basic characteristics of the Edo society and politics were equally follows.
(i) It was a class gild: The ruling course was samurai (war machine men who were permitted to carry a sword). And then farmers (ranked no.two), craftsmen (no.3), merchants (no.4). At that place was a big gap between the samurai class and other classes. Farmers were officially placed no.2 because they paid the rice revenue enhancement, merely they were not particularly respected. Below all of these classes, there were as well outcasts (eta and hinin).(These four classes were chosen Shi-Nou-Kou-Shou (from top to bottom). Historically, Vietnam besides had the distinction of Si-Nong-Cong-Thuong (Chinese characters are the aforementioned, only the pronunciation is different). It is clear that the idea originally came from China. In Vietnam, however, the superlative class "Si" meant scholars or literary bureaucrats, not fighting men. Moreover, it simply showed what types of people were of import and respectable in guild without political implication. The Edo government changed this thought into an ideology that legitimized a class social club with samurais on superlative.)
(2) Politically, it was a centralized organization. The Bakufu (central government) had accented political power over the fate of hans (local governments) and could even remove or abolish them. Information technology was a feudal society in the sense that the shogun gave daimyos the land to rule. In render, daimyos pledged loyalty to shogun. Any sign of disobedience was met with sternest punishment (oftentimes seppuku (ritual suicide) and/or the termination of the family unit).
(iii) Economically, it was more than decentralized. The Bakufu was non very capable of (or interested in) imposing consistent economic policies. Its policies were often unstable and brusque-sighted. Each han could decide its tax rates and other economic regulations, or encourage certain industries (so long as it was not explicitly prohibited by the Bakufu).
(4) The Bakufu imposed the post-obit expenses on hans. (i) sankin kotai, bi-annual commuting between habitation and Edo (i twelvemonth the daimyo must alive in Edo, next year in his han, and then Edo, and so domicile, ad infinitum) -- a big number of retainers likewise moved with him. This cost a large sum of money and normally constituted the largest part of han's expenditure; (two) public works ordered past the Bakufu, such equally building castles, moats, roads, irrigation ponds and canals, waterworks, etc; (three) other advertisement hoc and arbitrary taxes and charges.
Imposition of these financial expenses on hans had the consequence of weakening the financial capability of hans then they were unable to build military forces to rebel against the Bakufu.
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Figure 2-one
Bakufu-Han System
Agriculture
The Edo order was agrestal (particularly at the beginning) with nigh 90% of the population being peasants. Later, the ratio declined somewhat. The basic unit of production was the modest family. Previously, ane farming household often independent many families plus servants. Merely official country surveys (kenchi) conducted before and after the beginning of the Edo period dismantled the big family organization and created small farming units, with each family guaranteed of the land to cultivate.
According to the police, peasants had no right to motion and were tied to the country as labor forcefulness (they were the tax base !) But in reality, some farmers moved to new land, sometimes to avoid a high tax brunt, unreasonable policy or famine, only sometimes to look for new land to improve their life. Subsequently, equally rural income rose, many well-to-do farmers enjoyed village festivals too as trips to Ise Shrine and other religious spots (officially for worship, merely actually for fun).
Villages were well organized and permitted autonomy, as long equally they paid rice taxes equally stipulated. The rice tax was levied on villages (not individual farmers), and village representatives, who were often themselves farmers, allocated rice tax burden among all villagers. In a sense, they played the function of everyman-level taxation assistants. Thanks to them, the Bakufu and hans could heighten revenue enhancement revenues with little administrative cost. Prof. Keiichi Tanaka (Edo historian) argues that farmers were very dynamic and independent, and they often rejected Bakufu officials and policies which were inconsistent and unreasonable. (Prof. Tanaka thinks that the Bakufu had no long-term vision and their laws and regulations were ad hoc responses to unfolding events.)
There were two ways to determine the rice tax obligation. Ane was the kemi (inspection) system where an official inspector came to check the actual yield every year. Naturally, village representatives treated the official with lots of food and gifts. Some officials only had drinking parties and did not actually check the fields. The bribed official happily understated the ingather output (frequently very substantially) so villages paid much less taxes. According to Prof. Shinzaburo Oishi (historian), such corruption was an important reason for chronic revenue shortage of the authorities. On the other hand, if the visiting official was arbitrary and uncooperative, he might raise the taxation obligation to the chagrin of the farmers.
Another method was the jomen (stock-still amount) system where the rice tax was unchanged for three or 5 years based on the average output of the preceding years. Under this organisation, the government could expect a more stable tax revenue and also minimize the inspection cost. Farmers borne a greater risk for crop failure, only incentive to produce was too greater (if they worked hard, additional output was all theirs). According to Prof. Tanaka, farmers oftentimes preferred the jomen system considering they did not want to cope with decadent officials every yr.
During the Edo period, agricultural evolution underwent two phases: from quantitative expansion to qualitative intensification.
| Table 2-1 | |
| 930 AD | 862 |
| 1450 AD | 946 |
| 1600 AD | 1,635 |
| 1720 Advert | 2,970 |
| 1874 AD | 3,050 |
| Source: S. Oishi (1977). | |
From the mid 15th century to the belatedly 17th century (this includes the previous Sengoku Jidai (warring period) as well equally the early Edo menstruation), there was an enormous expansion of farmland (especially rice paddies). Earlier, rice was produced in narrow valleys where mountains ended and plains began--this was the only identify where constant water supply was available. But during this period, large-scale h2o projects were carried out all over Japan by daimyos and individual farmers to control floods and apply rivers for irrigation. As a result, state under tillage expanded dramatically. The plains, which had hitherto been uninhabitable marshlands, were turned into productive paddy fields. The population increased quickly (such population growth was very unusual for a pre-modern society). Prof. Shinzaburo Oishi calls this "The Keen Age of Opening Fields."
Later the late 17th century, land expansion came to a halt. The rapid growth of farmland in the previous period besides brought some negative furnishings, including (i) shortage of labor force; and (two) deforestation and frequent occurrence of floods. From this flow onward (fifty-fifty today), Japanese agronomics emphasized intensive cultivation with large inputs of labor and applied science, instead of quantitative expansion.
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| Agricultural technology in the Edo period |
From the 18th century onward, the surface area of cultivation and population remained relatively stable, but rice output continued to abound thanks to increased productivity. Contributing factors included double cropping, new species of rice, fertilizer (stale fish was popular), and invention of new farming tools. Many guidebooks were published to teach farmers how to produce crops more effectively and efficiently.
At the beginning of the Edo menstruation (17th century), peasants produced mainly for family unit consumption. They ate what they produced and their living standards were at subsistence levels. Withal, from the eye Edo period, equally productivity rose, agricultural surplus was created and peasants began to sell their rice and other crops to the market place (which was nationally integrated). Greenbacks crops increased and commercial agriculture began.
Officially, all farmers were supposed to belong to (or be tied to) pre-assigned land. Just in the 19th century as landless farmers increased, the landlord-tenant human relationship began to sally.
Farmers' uprisings (ikki) oft occurred, peculiarly at the time of dearth and toward the end of the Edo period. They were unhappy with taxes, inflation, famine, corrupt officials, or government policies.
Budget and money
The Bakufu'south revenue sources included the following:
--Rice tax from land straight held past Bakufu (land not distributed to other daimyos)
--Monopoly on mining, foreign trade and minting money
--Direct control on major cities (Edo, Kyoto, Osaka, Nagasaki, Sakai, etc)
--Financial contributions from merchants in exchange for monopoly & cartel permission
--Charges on and borrowings from rich merchants (sometimes not repaid)
--In addition, the Bakufu assigned hans to various public works, every bit noted above
Hans' acquirement included the following:
--Rice tax from its territory
--Revenues from local industries (if industrial promotion was successful)
The entire fiscal system was based on the rice taxation. The unit of fiscal account was "koku" (nigh 180 liters of rice). The han'southward economic size was measured in koku and samurai'southward salaries were paid in rice (but of form they had to convert it to cash to purchase things). Rice was physically collected from each village and transported to the major rice markets (Osaka was the most important national rice market place), then redistributed to the residue of the state. The "koku" size of each han was based on cultivated areas at the beginning, merely as new fields were opened and productivity rose, the official "koku" size and the actual "koku" size of each han deviated.
This rice-based organisation had the following consequences:
(1) Since rice had to be really shipped beyond regions, this tax system required a nationally unified transportation and distribution mechanism. Individual merchants provided such services but the Bakufu and han governments frequently guided and supported them. Land transportation (on horseback) was very costly and inefficient, and then sea and river transportation was mainly used.(2) Economic activity gradually shifted from subsistence farming to commercial agriculture and handicraft industries. But the government's tax base of operations basically remained on rice. In that location were some taxes on commerce only this did not go the reliable tax base. As a result, the Bakufu and han governments faced fiscal crisis while farmers and merchants were allowed to increase their income and wealth.
(three) Faced with chronic fiscal crisis, the Bakufu responded in the following ways: monetary debasement (similar to printing money, which leads to inflation), spending cuts, tax increases, price controls, administrative reforms. Some commercial policies were tried, including providing certain merchants with the sectional right to market place a product (i.e. monopoly) in exchange for fiscal contribution to the government.
Coin consisted of both gilt and silverish. Gold was popular in Edo and silvery was mainly used in Osaka. Copper money was also used for small transactions. Hans could besides consequence local paper money. Inflation rose at the fourth dimension of famine and accelerated toward the end of the Edo menses (especially after international trade was resumed).
Transportation and commerce
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| Tokaido "Highway" |
The Bakufu designated five official highways and opened major body of water lanes. Only private inns, restaurants, shippers, baggage carriers, etc. provided the necessary service. Farming villages near the highway were required to provide horses when necessary (office of their nontax obligation). Sankin kotai (bi-annual commuting past daimyos) as well stimulated the development of the road arrangement. At the aforementioned time, due to military reasons, Bakufu did not encourage free movement of people and trade. At major check points, sekisho (passport controls) were created. Some rivers were left without bridges, intentionally and for war machine reasons. Hans were not allowed to build ships or maintain navy.
As noted above, from the beginning, the Edo tax organization presupposed a nationally unified rice market. Development of cash crops and handicrafts as well stimulated nationwide commerce. Osaka was the commercial center with many rich merchants and coin lenders, while Edo was a political heart and consumption city. Naturally, the ocean lane between the two cities was well developed. In Osaka, the futures market in rice emerged (this is said to be the offset futures market in the globe).
The Bakufu'southward policy towards commerce and manufacture was variable and inconsistent. Sometimes the central government tried to command and tax individual businesses. Other times free economy was permitted. Cartels were sometimes imposed and other times prohibited. Among historians, opinions differ every bit to whether the Edo economy was more dynamic nether free market policy or pro-dare policy. Prof. Tetsuji Okazaki (Tokyo Academy) tries to testify that estimated Gross domestic product grew faster during the time when cartels were permitted than when they were banned. He argues that trade cartels were a positive factor for the evolution of the Edo economy rather than an impediment. Withal, his data and regressions may be too crude to be decisive.
Toward the end of the Edo menstruation, many hans and local cities developed economically. As a result, direct trading among them (without the intervention of Osaka merchants) began. The center of economical activity gradually moved due east, from Kansai (Osaka, Kyoto) to Edo and Eastern Nihon. Many markets (non merely rice, merely almost everything) were nationally integrated.
Industry
As agriculture and commerce grew, pre-modern manufacturing (handicrafts, nutrient processing) likewise began to develop. For instance, the post-obit products were produced:
tea, tobacco, wax, indigo, table salt, knives, sword, pottery, lacquer ware, silk, cotton, soy sauce, sake, paper, stone cutting, medicine, chemicals
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| Cotton wool weaving factory in Owari (Nagoya). No steam engines or electricity yet, merely sectionalisation of labor was underway. |
In lodge to enrich local population and increase revenue enhancement revenue, many hans promoted local industries, and some even succeeded (Due south. Nishikawa and Chiliad. Amano, 1989). For example,
Tokushima han (indigo): Farmers produced indigo forth the Yoshino River and their output gradually grew. But indigo distribution was monopolized by Osaka merchants who imposed high interest on loans. In order to protect local farmers and encourage local merchants, the han government created an indigo exchange and provided financial and distribution services. Merely the Bakufu objected to this movement, prohibiting such official support (the Bakufu wanted to protect Osaka merchants who contributed financially to the cardinal regime). So the han privatized the indigo substitution and other services.
Takamatsu han (saccharide): The Takamatsu government issued han's paper money to promote various industries but failed, and its coin depreciated. Afterward many such failed attempts, the han finally succeeded in research on sugar production (from sugar beets) and commercialized the engineering science. As sugar production greatly increased, the han promoted inter-han trade (direct trade between hans). But once more, the Bakufu tried to discourage such trade non brokered past Osaka merchants.
Satsuma han (military technology): This han in southern Kyushu imported new applied science from the West and produced blast furnace, cannons and western ships. It was also engaged in illegal trade with Ryukyu (Okinawa), which was very profitable. By increasing wealth and military capability, Satsuma han later played the fundamental role in toppling the Bakufu regime and establishing the Meiji authorities.
These are just a few examples. Many other hans were engaged in industrial promotion, including Choshu han (newspaper, wax), Yonezawa han (safflower, lacquer wax), Akita han (silk and silk apparel), Hizen han (pottery, coal), Higo han (lumber, silk), and then on. Just nosotros should not forget that at that place were many hans which were less successful and deeply in debt. They borrowed money from big individual merchants but never repaid.
Education
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| Bakufu school at Yushima Seido (Ochanomizu, Tokyo). Confucianism was taught to the sons of bakufu samurais. | Professional person school (enacted) |
The popularity of didactics in the Edo period is frequently cited as the cause of fast industrialization in later periods. Education in this flow ranged from the recondite study of Chinese philosophy and literature at public schools to children's chief education at individual schools. More specifically, four types of learning institutions were important.
(1) Bakufu schools
The bakufu's schools mainly taught Confucianism, an ancient Chinese philosophy started by Confucius in the 6th to fifth century BC. It emphasized social order, proper rituals, the way of good political leader, and respect for elderly and superior. The Edo government vigorously promoted Confucianism as an ideology to legitimize and maintain the course society. Seika Fujiwara and Razan Hayashi were the leading bakufu scholars. Students had to memorize and interpret aboriginal Chinese books. How to change this strange doctrine to fit the Japanese reality was one of the important theoretical questions. In that location were besides bakufu schools for European language (Dutch) and technology (medicine, navigation, armed services engineering, etc).
(2) Han schools
Hans likewise established schools to brainwash their immature samurais. The curriculums were basically the same as bakufu schools with Confucianism at the center of learning. Toward the finish of the Edo menses, han schools were expanded to emphasize practical skills such equally military training and foreign language. Some even accepted not-samurai students. Many han schools were transformed into education institutions in the following Meiji menses.
(three) Private professional person schools
An eminent scholar oft established his school and recruited students. Depending on the instructor, various subjects were taught: Confucianism, research on ancient Japanese literature (after leading to nationalism and anti-greenhorn movement), Western language (Dutch, later as well English language), medicine, science, technology, and and then on. These schools accustomed both samurai and not-samurai students. In the late Edo period, they often attracted talented and hot-hearted young people with the desire to contribute to the country. Their eyes were opened to the international situation and Nippon'south precarious position in it. A large number of national leaders in the late Edo period and the early Meiji menstruation came from such professional schools.
Tabular array 2-2
Examples of Private Professional Schools (Late Edo Period)
| School & location | Teacher & year of establishment | Main education | Prominent students |
| Shokason Juku (Hagi, Choshu Han) | Shoin Yoshida 1855-57 | Social and political philosophy | Shinsaku Takasugi (anti-bakufu fighter) Genzui Kusaka (anti-bakufu fighter) Hirobumi Ito (prime number minister) Aritomo Yamagata (prime minister) |
| Teki Juku (Osaka) | Koin Ogata 1838- | Dutch language & medicine | Yukichi Fukuzawa (founder of Keio Univ.) Masujiro Omura (military reformer) Sanai Hashimoto (Western studies) Keisuke Otori (Bakufu & Meiji statesman) |
| Narutaki Juku (Nagasaki) | Philipp F. B. von Siebold (German language) | Western medicine | Choei Takano (Western scholar) |
| Kangien | Tanso Hirose | Confucianism & ancient Chinese literature | Choei Takano (Western studies) |
(4) Terakoya (private chief schools)
These schools were run by local teachers for educational activity 3Rs -- reading, writing, and arithmetics (abacus) -- to small children, unremarkably starting from six years old. The popularity of terakoya all over Japan contributed to the very high literacy among the full general public.
 | Terakoya in extravaganza. The teacher simultaneously taught dissimilar things to different kids. In this picture, some kids are fighting in the corner. |
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Proto-industrialization and population dynamics
Economical historians have noticed that certain areas of Europe (say, Flanders in Belgium and Lancashire in England) were "industrialized" in the 17th-18th centuries, fifty-fifty before the Industrial Revolution began in the UK. This industrialization was characterized by rural, family-based production of cloth and garment without modern machinery (oft brokered by urban merchants).
The concept of proto-industrialization was proposed to explicate why this happened, and why it was observed in certain areas only (proto means primitive or early). The proponents accelerate a hypothesis to explain rural industrialization from the unique interaction among agriculture, population and commerce. Population growth is often considered given in economic modeling. But in the hypothesis of proto-industrialization, population dynamics is a crucial endogenous factor. F.F. Mendels and P. Deyon, who proposed this idea, ascertain proto-industrialization as the phenomenon satisfying the following three atmospheric condition:
--It is a manufacturing activity for market auction, not for home consumption.
--It is undertaken by peasants in a rural area (where soil is poor and plots are small).
--Information technology is located virtually an surface area of commercial agriculture with large farm size and loftier productivity.
Proto-industrialization begins as a side job in villages where agricultural productivity is low. They can sell cloth and garments to nearby rich villages where agricultural productivity is loftier. It is a sort of specialization (or sectionalisation of labor) within a relatively small geographical area: villages with fertile soil produce farm products and villages with poor soil produce manufactured goods, and they exchange output with each other (they also sell products to the exterior world also).
Furthermore, the hypothesis of proto-industrialization is demographically dynamic, as follows:
(i) For some reason, villages with poor soil confront a population increase, leading to food shortage.
(2) Poor peasants engage in the product of garments for sale to salve population pressure.
(3) This increases their income, and they starting time to get married sooner and have more than children.
(4) Population growth continues to keep the peasants just every bit poor as before even though they are more "industrialized."
(v) Supply of inexpensive labor is increased in this fashion, and rich farming villages and urban merchants continue to accrue wealth.(This widening income gap may possibly generate capitalists and landless farmers which leads to industrialization under full-fledged capitalism. Still, such historical linkage is non convincingly proven statistically.)
According to Prof. Osamu Saito (Hitotsubashi University), Japanese data in the Edo flow does not support the hypothesis of proto-industrialization as stated above. At that place is no evidence of systematic population change in the areas where peasants engaged in pre-modern manufacturing. On the contrary, it is said that farmers good birth control (sometimes even killing new-born babies) to cope with the population pressure.
At any rate, proto-industrialization seems to assume a rather peculiar population dynamics which may exist applicable to certain European regions in sure periods, but not in the rest of the world or other periods. However, the thought of population growth responding to the procedure of early industrialization is an interesting one.
Additional Questions & Answers
<References>
Dore, Ronald P., Education in Tokugawa Japan, University of Michigan Center, 1984.
Iwanami Shoten, Keizai Shakai no Seiritsu: 17-18 seiki, Nihon Keizaishi 1 (Establishment of Economic Social club: 17th-18th Centuries, Japanese Economic History vol. 1), A. Hayami & One thousand. Miyamoto, eds, 1988.
Iwanami Shoten, Kindai Seicho no Taido, Nihon Keizaishi two (Signs of Modern Evolution, Japanese Economic History vol. 2), H. Shimbo & O. Saito, eds, 1989.
Nishikawa, Shunsaku, and Masatoshi Amano, "Shohan no Sangyo to Keizai Seisaku" (Industries and Economical Policies of Hans) in Iwanami Shoten, 1989.
Oishi, Shinzaburo, Edo Jidai (The Edo Period), Chuko Shinsho no.476, 1977.
Okazaki, Tetsuji, Edo no Sijokeizai: Rekishiseidobunseki kara Mita Kabunakama (The Market Economy of Edo: Merchandise Cartels from the Viewpoint of Historical Institutional Analysis), Kodansha Sensho Metier 155, 1999.
Saito, Osamu, Proto Kogyoka no Jidai (The Age of Proto-Industrialization), Japan Hyoronsha, 1985.
Tanaka, Keiichi, Hyakusho no Edo Jidai (The Edo Flow Led by Farmers), Chikuma Shinsho, 2000.
Source: https://www.grips.ac.jp/teacher/oono/hp/lecture_J/lec02.htm
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